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Liability for Life 
by Carl E. Schneider 
Marshall Klavan headed the Obstetrics and Gynecology 
Department of the Crozer-
Chester Medical Center. 1 He deeply 
feared strokes, perhaps because his fa-
ther had been savaged by one. In 1993, 
Dr. Klavan wrote an advance directive 
which said that (as a court later put it) 
"he 'absolutely did not want any extra-
ordinary care measures utilized by 
health care providers."' 
On April29, 1997, Dr. Klavan tried 
to kill himsel£ He left suicide notes and 
a note refusing resuscitation. The next 
morning, medical center employees 
found him unconscious and took him 
to the emergency room, where he was 
resuscitated. By May 2, Dr. Klavan had 
fallen into a persistent vegetative state. 
His family and his lawyer told the cen-
ter about his notes and his advance di-
rective. On May 4, the center "agreed to 
provide care in accordance with" the ad-
vance directive, but on May 5 Dr. Kla-
van's condition worsened and the center 
again resuscitated him. He "then suf-
fered a stroke that rendered him men-
tally and physically incompetent." 
A suit was brought on Dr. Klavan's 
behalf in federal court. It claimed that 
his fourteenth amendment right to 
refuse medical treatment was being de-
nied. The fourteenth amendment, how-
ever, restricts only governments, not 
private institutions. Had the govern-
ment so deeply implicated itself in the 
center's activities that it had effectively 
become a governmental institution? 
The court thought not, leaving Dr. Kla-
van's representative only with state-law 
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claims. The federal court had discretion 
to take jurisdiction of those claims, but 
it refused: "While Dr. Klavan's situation 
cries out for prompt and definitive judi-
cial resolution, we nevertheless decline 
to exercise our discretion . . . precisely 
because of the gravity of his case." 
How did this sad case reach this un-
settling result? First, the story I have 
told may be false. 2 Klavan was decided 
before a trial could determine what had 
actually happened. To decide whether it 
had jurisdiction, the court accepted as 
true everything Dr. Klavan's representa-
tive had alleged. The court concluded 
that even if all the allegations were true, 
it should not grant the relief Dr. Kla-
van's representative sought. Therefore 
we have no idea what the medical cen-
ter's defense was or how any factual dis-
putes would have been resolved in a 
trial. (And even had there been a trial, 
we could not be sure of its conclusions.) 
More broadly, however, the Klavan 
court's reluctance to address the dispute 
was typical of the judicial reaction to 
the (uncommon) attempts to enforce 
living wills. Such attempts are of two 
kinds. First, people locked in a dispute 
about treating an incompetent patient 
can ask a court to settle the disagree-
ment. In doing so, the court can look at 
the living will and any other relevant ev-
idence. Second, after a patient dies, the 
family might sue to recover the damages 
the patient suffered because the living 
will was disobeyed. Why have courts 
not embraced either kind of litigation? 
In part, courts' hesitation to enforce 
living wills reflects a judicial aversion to 
disputes about treating the dying. Such 
disputes demand a speed courts can 
rarely attain. The patient has often died 
by the time lawyers have been consult-
ed, non-legal solutions have been ex-
hausted, a decision to litigate has been 
reached, and legal documents and evi-
dence have been prepared. Just as bad is 
the "standards" problem: These deci-
sions raise issues the law addresses too 
obscurely to guide courts. And given 
the complexity and perplexity of end-
of-life decisions, more illuminating 
rules probably are impossible. 
So courts have acquiesced-tacitly 
and sometimes expressly-in relegating 
these decisions to an informal process in 
which doctors and families work toward 
a consensus that the time has come to 
let the patient die. Courts may be right 
to do so: Evidence is spotty, but it hints 
that patients' families are generally satis-
fied with this process and that their dis-
satisfactions would not be soothed by 
litigation. 
But if the problem is speed, don't liv-
ing wills solve it? If families can sue 
physicians who have ignored living 
wills, can't families enforce living wills 
simply by threatening to sue after the 
patient died? Don't doctors fear litiga-
tion so acutely that they will succumb 
to mere menace? 
In Duarte v. Chico Community Hos-
pital, the patient's family brought such a 
suit.3 Although the patient had no liv-
ing will, she had said emphatic things 
while she was competent. Nevertheless, 
the court rejected the suit because of a 
California statute which said that even 
if a surrogate appointed in a power of 
attorney orders a physician to stop treat-
ment, the physician "is not subject to 
criminal prosecution, civil liability, or 
professional disciplinary action for fail-
ing to withdraw health care necessary to 
keep the principal alive." 
Why? The law rarely pursues any 
goal maximally. We want to reduce au-
tomobile pollution, but not so much 
that we cripple car makers, or double 
car prices, or take jobs from workers, or 
walk to work. We don't even do all we 
could to eliminate crime, since we don't 
want to spend the money or live in a 
police state. The law therefore rarely 
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contemplates eliminating wrongdoing 
and usually structures incentives to me-
diate among our conflicting goals. 
That is presumably what California's 
legislature was doing. It obviously cher-
ished people's right to refuse treatment; 
it had recently passed a "Natural Death 
Act" authorizing people to "execute at 
any time a declaration governing the 
withholding or withdrawal of life-sus-
taining treatment." But it obviously 
thought people's lives should not be 
ended improvidently, even if they are 
very ill or even dying. 
Thus the legislature presumably 
wanted a structure of incentives that 
would balance the pressures on people 
making end-of-life decisions so that ac-
quiescing to anyone who wanted to 
stop treatment would not be the course 
of least resistance and greatest safety for 
doctors. Perhaps the legislature did not 
find the right balance, but it did find 
the right method. A bane of law-mak-
ing is the irrepressible tendency to make 
policy wholly in response to the latest 
horror story-in our example, Dr. Kla-
van's case. No legal regime will ever pre-
vent all bad results: the goal is the sys-
tem that prevents the fewest. 
Not only does policy that reacts pri-
marily to horror stories swing madly 
from one extreme to the other, but such 
stories may better represent the past 
than the future. Living wills are of their 
time and place, a time and place in 
which doctors seemed persistently and 
gruesomely to overtreat dying patients: 
''Although living wills are promoted as 
tools to extend personal decision mak-
ing, from a practical standpoint they 
encourage a particular type of choice: 
the refusing of medical interventions 
perceived to be invasive and valueless 
near the end of life .... Nearly all living 
wills now written prohibit such behav-
ior and attempt to prevent overtreat-
ment."4 
But if the issue is whether to enforce 
living wills, we must ask not just what 
problems affiicted the past, and not just 
what problems attend the present, but 
also what problems will infect the fu-
ture. There is mounting evidence that 
overtreatment has abated markedly and 
should continue to diminish, if only be-
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cause doctors and hospitals have ever 
fewer financial reasons to overtreat and 
ever more to undertreat. One physician 
puts the point vividly: "The medical 
community that insisted on continuing 
treatment of Karen Quinlan and Nancy 
Cruzan petitioned the courts to stop 
treatment of Helga Wanglie. "5 All this 
makes it less urgent and even more haz-
ardous to make living wills easier to en-
force. 
But aren't the arguments against en-
forcement irrelevant if patients can tell 
doctors, surrogates, and courts what 
treatments they will want when incom-
petent? In particular, doesn't the "stan-
dards" problem go away? Much de-
pends on whether you think living wills 
dependably describe the decisions pa-
tients would have made. Here again the 
issue is not whether anyone can ever 
write a living will that captures the pa-
tient's "real" preferences; the issue is 
whether that happens often enough to 
justify imposing liability on physicians. 
On that issue, the case for skepticism is 
convincing. As Angela Fagerlin and I 
have argued, the empirical evidence 
now compels us to doubt that (1) peo-
ple generally form sound and stable in-
tentions about future medical prefer-
ences, (2) people reliably articulate 
those intentions accurately and compre-
hensibly, and (3) surrogates can ordi-
narily divine those intentions from the 
living will. 6 
Crucially, patients themselves seem 
so much to share these and other 
doubts that in one study 54 percent of 
the patients studied were willing to have 
their surrogates override even a "per-
fect" living will.? No court should want 
to enforce a document whose authors 
are so ambivalent and so likely not to 
want the document to be binding. 
Courts hesitate to enforce living wills 
for yet another reason. When lawyers 
think about liability, they ask what 
damages the wrongdoer should pay the 
victim. Thus in Anderson v. St. Francis-
St. George Hospital-a case about en-
forcing a DNR order the patient him-
self had requested-the Ohio Supreme 
Court asked "what damages flow from 
the 'harm' caused the plaintiff" if an 
order is ignored. 8 The "harm'' is that the 
patient is alive. The court doubted that 
life is a legal harm and that juries can 
intelligently set a price on unwanted 
life. The court concluded that "[t]here 
are some mistakes, indeed even breach-
es of duty or technical assaults, that 
people make in this life that affect the 
lives of others for which there simply 
should be no monetary compensation." 
This is what lawyers call a damnum 
absque injuria, a "[l]oss, hurt, or harm 
without injury in the legal sense, that is, 
without such breach of duty as is re-
dressible by an action."9 A suit to en-
force a living will is a sign that horrible 
and irreconcilable differences polluted 
efforts to make decisions for a patient. 
It is unlikely that any such disaster can 
be adjudicated post hoc in ways that 
should make us comfortable assessing 
liability. An imprecise but illuminating 
analogy is no-fault divorce. Marriage 
creates legal liabilities that can be adju-
dicable, but most states have decided 
that fault is ordinarily distributed ob-
scurely enough, that evidence is ordi-
narily hard enough to obtain and ana-
lyze, and that litigation ordinarily is so 
destructive that the legal rights marriage 
creates have been left unenforceable. In 
love and death alike, not all wrongs can 
be righted, and yet fewer can be righted 
by the law. 
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